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Introduction

If you were a superhero, what would be your superpower?1 Flying? Invisibility? Time travel? I would pass up these familiar options in favor of the
profoundly important but woefully underrated power of conﬁguration—the
ability to divide things up that arrive in lumps and to put things together
that arrive in pieces.2 These feats might sound simple, but they are extraordinarily valuable and often maddeningly elusive.
To see why, think of all the things that might do you more good if they
were sliced up differently. Perhaps you would prefer a job that involves a
third less work and a third less pay, or a home that is half its size except
when you are entertaining, or a car that materializes only when needed
and is priced accordingly, or a dog that provides half the affection and requires half the walking. Next, think of the many things that arrive in fragments but that gain much or all of their value only when put together.
The pieces necessary to build a complete rather than partial bridge. Votes
to create a political result. The increments of studying necessary to pass a
high-stakes exam. Patent licenses to produce a particular product. Or the
bits of extra space between parallel-parked cars that you wish you could
aggregate together to create a space large enough for your car. Getting part
of the way there doesn’t always get you a proportionate share of the total
beneﬁt (think of a partial bridge or a partial parking space).
Superpowers throw human limitations into plain view, and a central
goal of this book is to explore why reconﬁguration is both important
and difﬁcult. Once we look carefully, we see that difﬁculties in slicing
and lumping shape much of the way we have organized our lives, and a
great deal of law and policy as well. From hot button issues like eminent
domain and habitat conservation to developments in the so-called sharing economy (better termed “the slicing economy,” I argue) to personal
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struggles over work, risk, money, time, diet, and exercise, how things are
divided up or aggregated together matters tremendously. Understanding
the nature of conﬁguration problems enables us to deal more effectively
with them. By exerting control over how things are divvied up or pieced
together, individuals, ﬁrms, and governments can shape outcomes in every
domain of life, law, and policy.
Conﬁguration, in short, is power. It is a power that has become increasingly pressing to understand and harness. New technologies and growing
urbanization have made it easier than ever to bring people together in both
real and virtual space to share ideas, make new things, and join forces on
projects of all kinds. At the same time, emerging forms of unbundling,
from jobs to cars to homes to entertainment, have reﬁned the slices in
which we produce and consume. It is no exaggeration to say that the future
of the city, the workplace, the marketplace, and the environment all turn
on questions of conﬁguration, as do the prospects for more effective legal
doctrines, for better management of ﬁnances and health, and much more.
Yet the art and science of conﬁguration is not a recognized ﬁeld of inquiry.
This book aims to make it one.
By the end of the book, I hope to have convinced you of the power of
conﬁguration, and to have illuminated how indivisibility and fragmentation generate—and sometimes help solve—a wide range of legal and social
problems. My inquiry uncovers some unappreciated and often surprising
ways that the increments into which choices or resources are divided or
aggregated can inﬂuence human behavior. This book highlights how governmental actors, markets, and households slice and lump (often in unacknowledged ways) and how they might do these things better. I offer
strategies for recognizing and harnessing the power of slicing and lumping
in law, policy, and everyday life. I hope to make conﬁguration entrepreneurship salient—both as a focus of private and public innovation and as a crucial form of life-hacking.
The evocative economic concept of “lumpy goods” offers a starting
point for my analysis. In a classic paper, Michael Taylor and Hugh Ward
observe that some goods, like bridges and rail lines, “cannot be usefully
provided in any amounts but only in more or less massive ‘lumps.’”3 Lumpiness sometimes refers to a desired end state, like the complete bridge. In
other cases lumpiness represents an impediment to reaching a preferred end
state—one wants only part of a job, say, or a share of a car, but (for whatever reason) the good is produced or provided in an all-or-nothing fashion. The inability to divide things up also limits the ability to make things
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incrementally bigger. For example, production or computing capacity can
often be added only in large chunks.
Some constraints are physical or technical in nature and may be surmounted, if at all, at great expense. For example, the Silver Spirit cruise
ship, a 642-foot-long vessel in Silversea’s ﬂeet, was recently cut in half to
insert a new forty-nine-foot midsection that will add about 12 percent
to its passenger capacity.4 This ship-splicing represents a rare engineering
feat—one that will consume roughly 450,000 worker-hours—and its difﬁculty and cost attest to the inherent lumpiness involved.5 Evolving technology is making rapid inroads on other kinds of indivisibility, however,
as we see with new platforms for dividing access to houses, cars, clothing,
and more. Many other forms of lumpiness are intentionally constructed by
government or private actors—minimum lot sizes or product bundles, for
example—and thus represent potentially malleable features of social, legal,
and transactional settings.
Despite the evident centrality of lumpiness and divisibility to law and
policy, these concepts have received only scattered attention from legal
scholars. This might seem surprising, especially given the prominence that
the economic analysis of law enjoys. But economics itself also tends to neglect these matters.6 This is partly for reasons of mathematical simplicity—
models are more tractable if a linear relationship between inputs and outputs is assumed.7 And in the large-number settings that much economic
analysis focuses on, indivisibility is not especially consequential: for a factory making hundreds of widgets per day, it hardly matters that producing
each widget is an all-or-nothing proposition.8 Moreover, economists have
long recognized that although individual decisions may be lumpy—a stable owner cannot reduce his team by a fraction of a horse when oat prices
rise slightly—markets as a whole exhibit what Andreu Mas-Colell calls “the
regularizing effects of aggregation.”9 At a large enough scale, lumps come
out in the wash.
Yet for individuals—workers, consumers, household members, risk bearers, taxpayers, and citizens—lumps matter profoundly. As Hagan Bobzin
observes, making one more car “is of little signiﬁcance for an automobile
company, whereas a household faces considerable consequences depending on whether it has got a car or not.”10 People cannot successfully navigate the interactions that are most important to their lives without at least
an intuitive understanding of the signiﬁcance of slicing and lumping. For
related reasons, law and policy cannot afford to ignore matters of conﬁguration. Not only is legal analysis frequently concerned with the structure of

C7560-Fennell.indd 3

S
N
3

5/1/19 10:33 AM

4 / Introduction

S
N
4

individual decisions, but social policy regularly addresses unique, indivisible goods and large-scale goals that are not amenable to the marketplace’s
alchemy of averaging.
Take conservation, a context in which recognizing lumps of value can
upend established ways of pursuing goals. Mary Ellen Hannibal recently
observed: “For more than one hundred years, conservation has functioned
by drawing a boundary around a special area and limiting human impacts
there . . . . But science today tells us this approach is failing. Nature doesn’t
work without connection.”11 In other words, the world is lumpy, and some
of the most signiﬁcant lumps of value may not correspond to the ways
in which resources like land have traditionally been sliced up. This reality is now being recognized through efforts to create migratory pathways
and wildlife corridors. Here, as in other contexts, it is impossible to devise
meaningful solutions without appreciating the lumpiness lurking in natural and social phenomena.
Lumpiness can also produce or explain behavior that seems to defy basic economic principles. For example, the law of diminishing marginal returns suggests that the next unit of a good will add less value than the previous unit. Lumpiness inverts that relationship: at times, one needs more
of something to get any return at all. The lumpy or fragmented features of
a given situation may also elicit behavior that is mistakenly attributed to
behavioral biases. For instance, a person who plays the lottery or elects a
lump sum over a larger payment stream may not be irrational or myopic,
but rather simply expressing a strong preference for a lumpy consumption
experience that is difﬁcult or impossible to attain in any other way. Paying
attention to conﬁguration forces us to rethink our assumptions.
This is an especially exciting and crucial time to be studying questions of
slicing and lumping. As increasing urbanization and environmental threats
raise the stakes for land conﬁguration choices, a technology-fueled entrepreneurial explosion is underway that is dividing goods, services, and jobs
in novel ways, from Airbnb to Zipcar. This book highlights the connections
between these and other social and economic developments, and examines the opportunities and concerns they present. It also sheds new light
on chronic intrapersonal struggles, from overeating to the management of
time and money, as well as persistent legal and policy puzzles, from the
best way to deliver beneﬁts to the best way to address risky behavior.
A few words about the book’s methods and goals will help to frame
what follows. My approach here is primarily analytic. I seek to understand and explain conﬁguration problems, to get inside them and see how
they work, rather than advocate for particular solutions to them. Yet in so
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doing, I mean to shed light on the ways that conﬁguration matters to human well-being, and on the potential for better conﬁgurations to improve
our lives. This book emphasizes the signiﬁcance of the lumps and slices we
encounter, and the need for our analyses and habits of thought to account
for them. But this does not mean we must accept conﬁgurations as we ﬁnd
them. Even when indivisibilities arise from ecological or other natural phenomena, human reactions to them are malleable, making conﬁguration an
active enterprise, not a static fact. The words in my title are verbs as well
as nouns.
For concreteness, my exposition is intensely example driven. There are
large and deep literatures attached to many of the speciﬁc contexts I touch
upon, which I cannot do justice to here. My aim is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of each of these situated examples, but rather to highlight
the common structure they share—a forest that has been largely ignored
in favor of individual trees. The book thus engages in a type of metalumping by highlighting connections and commonalities among diverse
conﬁguration challenges that have previously been treated in isolation. At
the same time, this book distinguishes problems involving lumpy or indivisible goals or goods from the other types of collective action problems
that tend to dominate the popular and academic imagination—a form of
meta-slicing.
The ﬁrst four chapters of the book lay the conceptual groundwork, starting with an overview in chapter 1 of the types of indivisibilities that appear in markets, communities, personal life, and law. Chapter 2 shows how
lumpiness arises in high-proﬁle contexts like eminent domain, which involves the forcible assembly of land, as well as in settings where resources
that are currently co-owned must be split up among claimants. I show that
these two types of problems—assembly and division—are not distinct, as
is usually assumed, nor is one inherently harder to solve than the other. Instead, they share a common structure: each type of reconﬁguration requires
both assembly (of consent by the affected stakeholders, or an overriding of
their lack of consent) and division (of the surplus that is thereby created).
In both cases, what is really being pieced together—whether voluntarily or
through coercion—is cooperation in pursuit of a lumpy goal, the resource’s
reconﬁguration.
Chapter 3 extends this theme of assembling cooperation to collective
action problems more broadly, whether saving a ﬁshery from collapse or
collecting funds to cure a disease. I show how lumpy social goals—ones
that are all-or-nothing—present different, and generally more favorable,
prospects for success than the standard tragedy-of-the-commons scenario.
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Also signiﬁcant are the ways in which the resources to be harvested
or the tasks to be contributed are divided up. Chapter 4 then considers
how choice menus—whether sizes of sodas or technologies for ﬁghting
pollution—affect behavior by deﬁning the increments in which people can
take actions. When alternatives are chunky rather than continuous, people often must produce or consume either less or more than they would
prefer—with overlooked and sometimes surprisingly positive implications
for behaviors that have spillovers on others.
Chapter 5 turns to the ways in which aggregation and division impact
intrapersonal dilemmas. Many of the same considerations that we observe
in collective action problems among different people also apply when the
players are different versions of oneself. Likewise, the chunkiness of the
choices one encounters can edge decisions closer to one’s overall long-term
interests or push them further away. Finding ways to strategically engineer
and personalize choice menus offers new avenues for addressing selfcontrol problems. Chapter 6 extends these ideas into the realms of personal ﬁnancial management and public ﬁnance. Recognizing the signiﬁcance of aggregation and division in saving and spending can improve how
households manage their budgets and how governments formulate taxes,
incentives, and beneﬁts.
The next four chapters show how aggregation and division crop up in
several important domains: the workplace, the marketplace, the home, and
the city. Transformations are underway in all of these settings. Chapter 7
explores how new business models that slice time, effort, attention, and
risk in unprecedented ways are changing how people work and play. The
gig economy represents one manifestation of this shift, and the ambivalence surrounding it can be understood in terms of lumpiness: delumping
the working experience has also meant decoupling work from many of its
standard accompaniments, including health insurance. Chapter 8 examines the developing slicing economy in the marketplace for products and
services. Here I explore the prospects and limits of swapping full-strength
ownership for on-demand access. I also show how indivisibilities crop up
in product bundling, sizing, pricing, and standardization, with implications for consumer choice.
Chapter 9 turns to housing, where innovative new forms of slicing
abound, from platforms like Airbnb to social housing designs that deliver
partial homes. At the same time, legal and policy choices often contribute to a discontinuous, chunky menu of housing alternatives that omits or
limits options that people might prefer—such as very small units suitable
for one-person households. Analyzing this constructed form of lumpiness
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in housing raises questions about the scope of the home, ones that require
examining complementarities between individual dwellings and the surrounding community. Chapter 10 widens the viewﬁnder to take in the city,
where the questions of land assembly that appear early in the book are reconsidered in connection with agglomeration beneﬁts (urban vitality) and
costs (congestion). Perhaps the most pressing economic question of our
day is how to make the most of our cities, which are themselves a paradigmatic instance of the power—and challenges—of aggregation.
The ﬁnal pair of chapters extends the analysis of aggregation and lumpiness into legal decisions and doctrines. Chapter 11 begins with the observation that law often constructs cliffs or generates all-or-nothing outcomes.
For example, judicial decisions are very often binary in nature (one party
wins entirely and the other loses entirely). Messy facts drawn from a continuum of possibilities are rendered into all-or-nothing outcomes. Much
turns, then, on the “thresholding” processes that the law uses to generate
these on-off results. Questions of aggregation play a decisive role: a momentary lapse of judgment, for example, might fall on one side of a legal
line if viewed in isolation and on the other if considered as part of a larger
pattern of careful or careless behavior. Chapter 12 shows that many legal
and policy debates boil down to disagreements about bundling—whether
of precautions, property interests, behavior, regulations, or legislation. Because the power to bundle or unbundle can dramatically change results,
battles over bundles are some of the most interesting and consequential
disputes in law and policy.
The book concludes with takeaways for policy makers, lawyers, academics, and anyone else who is interested in understanding and leveraging the
lessons of lumpiness. Issues of lumpiness and divisibility touch nearly every corner of human experience, and they offer countless opportunities for
innovation and entrepreneurship. Although the contexts I cover are necessarily illustrative rather than exhaustive, I hope that this book will spur
others to identify additional arenas where the ideas explored here can be
applied and extended. There are, of course, many other ways that the terrain I cover could have been broken up and heaped together. But I hope
that the current conﬁguration will let through enough light to intrigue you,
and to inspire your own efforts at lump building.
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Picture a bridge spanning a chasm. Removing one chunk of the span renders it worthless—indeed, it is no longer even a bridge. Because bridges are
useless unless they are complete, they offer intuitive examples of lumpy,
indivisible, or “step” goods. Lumpiness is found not only in large-scale infrastructure like bridges, highways, and railroad lines, but also in ordinary
products and services. Some goods, like car tires or developable land, are
more valuable if consumed in particular quantities or combinations. Others, like cars, jobs, houses, and pets, are often available only in difﬁcult-todivide chunks. Conditions like species survival or election wins depend on
maintaining or reaching critical thresholds, not merely coming close. Legal
rules and litigation outcomes may also exhibit lumpiness, operating in an
all-or-nothing fashion, or producing results only when some threshold of
compliance or deterrence is reached. And the lumpy ﬁxed costs that attach
to many endeavors—from introducing a new product to passing a new law
to learning a new skill—make choices fewer and chunkier for ﬁrms, consumers, citizens, and workers than they otherwise would be.1
These and many other examples will be explored in the chapters
that follow. Here, I take up two foundational questions: What counts as
“lumpy”? And why do we care? The answers to these questions will preview the range of aggregation and division problems taken up in this book.
Many of these problems involve desired, attempted, thwarted, or contested
reconﬁgurations—attempts to slice up things that are difﬁcult to divide or
to aggregate things that start out in pieces. Others concern the appropriate
legal or practical treatment of naturally occurring or constructed lumps,
whether in regulatory policy, legal analysis, informal order, bargaining settings, or the realm of self-control.
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What’s Lumpy?
The idea of lumpiness seems intuitive, but the term is used in more than
one way and encompasses a variety of phenomena. Some distinctions and
deﬁnitions will help to set the stage.
Supply, Demand, and Lumpiness
We might refer to a good as a lumpy or indivisible either because this is how
the good delivers its value (in a lump, like a bridge) or because the good arrives in a lump and is accompanied by constraints (natural or constructed)
that make it difﬁcult or costly to divide (think of the full-time position that
does not allow for part-time work). These are, in a sense, opposite meanings. In the ﬁrst, lumpiness describes a desired end state (the completed
bridge). In the second, lumpiness describes a suboptimal starting point
(the full-time job). In both cases, there is a mismatch between the starting
point and the desired end state, but what is necessary to span that gap differs. To build the full bridge, many smaller pieces must be assembled. The
lumpy job comes preassembled, and that is exactly the problem—a slice of
the job would be preferable for the employee.
One way to express this distinction is between goods that are lumpy in
demand (people want full bridges) and goods that are lumpy in supply (cars
and pets come in whole number units). Some goods might be described
either way. For instance, we could say that an employer supplies jobs in
full-time increments or demands labor in full-time increments. Regardless,
lumpiness becomes interesting where what is desired (by someone) takes
a different form than what is provided (by someone else). A good that is
lumpy in demand, like a bridge, often must be assembled from inputs—
bridge segments, labor, ﬁnancial contributions, and so on—that are fragmented in supply. A good that is lumpy in supply, like a car, may need to
be split into smaller use-slices to effectively meet consumer demand.
Often lumpiness is of no consequence because it can be addressed
through ordinary markets or informal transactions. For example, if the
smallest unit of candy that can be economically produced and sold separately is a 1.5 ounce candy bar, and if most people have no desire to purchase candy in smaller increments than this, whatever theoretical lumpiness may exist presents no difﬁculties. Lumpiness becomes problematic
when the supplied units are much larger or smaller than desired (think of
a mammoth candy bar or a single chocolate chip) and there are signiﬁcant
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impediments to dividing up the larger unit or aggregating the smaller ones.
The obstacles may stem from physical constraints or the costs of engaging in market transactions.2 They may even be social or psychological in
nature. Philip Henry Wicksteed, writing in 1910, observes that the commercial standard of supplying ink in one-penny measures effectively precludes
people from acquiring smaller quantities, given the “awkwardness and humiliation” involved in negotiating with a stationer for a smaller amount.3
Lumpiness can also cause difﬁculties when everyone agrees that the
initial (lumpy) conﬁguration is the most valuable one, but there is more
than one plausible claimant. A vivid example is the dispute over the baby
that featured in King Solomon’s famous decision.4 Babies, it turns out, are
extremely lumpy. Luckily, there are alternatives to physical division, and
the Solomonic outcome illustrated one of them—an award to the claimant
who clearly valued the child more. As the literature on this topic has noted,
indivisibilities may be addressed through a variety of techniques, including slicing the good temporally (e.g., through rotation systems); converting
the good into something divisible like money, as by auctioning it off; giving claimants chances at the good that are proportionate to the strength of
their claims; or giving the good to one claimant while compensating the
others.5
Temporal slicing of goods is an especially intriguing solution because
it can bridge the gap between the physical conﬁguration that maximizes
value and the amount of the good that a particular individual wants, needs,
or is entitled to receive. It works well for goods that are far more valuable
when physically intact, where people do not want, and are unwilling to
pay for, the whole thing. No formal slicing is necessary if people can agree
to share the resource. In some cases we manage to do exactly that.6 People
form clubs or enter communities to consume certain kinds of indivisible
goods—swimming pools, tennis courts, clubhouses, and so on. Other varieties of time slicing are longstanding and familiar: library books, hotel
rooms, rental cars, and so on. Entrepreneurs are now ﬁnding a multitude
of ways to create small-scale market transactions that further ﬁne-tune slicing, as evidenced by Airbnb, Uber, and many other business models. An extreme example is Recharge, an app that allows people to buy “microstays”
at hotels and apartments, priced by the minute.7
Consider another innovation in temporal slicing, pet sharing.8 Companion animals, like babies or bridges, are lumpy and can’t be physically
divided. But the unit in which pets arrive is not necessarily the optimal
unit in which their companionship is consumed. Suppose that for one individual, Angus, dog ownership is great fun for a few days a week, but the
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burden continues to grow as the week wears on, and the beneﬁts diminish
apace. If the unfun days of Angus’s dog-owning week could be transferred
to other people who similarly experience declining returns from dog ownership (Beth and Cam, say), the dog could deliver a larger total quantum of
enjoyment to its (now plural) owners.
There may be problems, of course. Time-share dog owners may shirk on
bathing the dog or taking him to the vet. The dog may never get properly
trained, or the constant parade of owners may produce anxiety or confusion for the dog. Some of these issues might be overcome by, for example,
having a platform manager who coordinates tasks, establishes minimum
time blocks, and sets care standards, but these solutions add to the costs of
time slicing. BorrowMyDoggy.com, which currently operates in the UK and
Ireland, enables a pet owner who retains primary responsibility for her pup
to offer short-term “borrowing” in exchange for dog walking, care, or socialization, while the platform provider collects a fee that covers veterinarian access and insurance.9 This model offers an approximation of informal
interactions over pets among friends and family, adapted to urban settings
where people often lack preexisting social networks.10 Here, as in many
other contexts, from ride sharing to home sharing, we see new models for
managing lumpiness emerge as earlier (and mostly unremarked) ways of
informally aligning supply and demand break down.
Some Terminology
The notion of lumpiness connects tightly to the concepts of indivisibility
and complementarity. To say that a good is indivisible or that it exhibits indivisibilities does not usually mean that the good literally cannot be divided, but rather that it is considerably less valuable when divided, or that
it is expensive (perhaps prohibitively so) to divide successfully.11 The idea
of complementarity refers to the fact that certain goods and services produce more value when consumed in particular combinations. Right and
left shoes are a standard example. Because most people have two feet of
similar size and follow the social custom of shodding them identically,
a pair of shoes typically delivers far more than twice as much value as a
single shoe. Likewise, the segments that make up a full bridge span are
strongly complementary; subtract just one, and the bridge becomes useless.
A partially fenced yard does no better than an unfenced yard at containing
animals, a car with three tires drives no better than a car with no tires, and
small and scattered patches of land are useless for large-scale development.
In these familiar examples, indivisibilities are a function of comple-
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mentarities. A set of tires or a pair of shoes exhibits indivisibilities not because tires or shoes are physically hard to separate from each other, but
rather because splitting them up would be self-defeating—they are much
more valuable when consumed together. Not all indivisibilities track complementarities in this way. Other things that we might characterize as indivisible (cars, jobs, pets, houses, and so on) might be more valuable in
pieces (whether time slices or physical slices) but dividing them up is for
some reason technologically or administratively difﬁcult.12 I will use the
term indivisibility in this book as a synonym for lumpiness. The notion of
complementarity represents a general purpose explanation for why goods
or services might be more valuable when aggregated in certain ways.
Two other terms associated with lumpiness are discontinuities and nonlinearities. Returns from activities like studying or voting are often discontinuous: making it over some threshold makes the difference between passing and failing, or between winning and losing an election. Nonlinearities
occur when outcomes do not increase smoothly and proportionately in
response to inputs. There may be increasing returns (economies of scale),
diminishing returns (diseconomies of scale), sharp steps or notches at particular thresholds, or some mix of these effects. The economic tool of the
production function, which maps inputs to outputs, provides traction on
these ideas.
Lumpy Production Functions
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Lumpiness can be understood as a certain kind of relationship between inputs (units of effort, money, or resources) and outputs (conditions, events,
products, or services). Consider, for example, the connection between dollars contributed to a charity and the beneﬁts that the charity generates in
the world. If this relationship is plotted on a graph with well-being improvements on the vertical axis and dollars on the horizontal axis, what
shape will the curve take?
There are many possibilities.13 Perhaps the relationship is linear, at least
within a particular range, so that each additional dollar generates the same
uptick in beneﬁts. Think of assistance that buys increments of soup, medical care, or clean drinking water, which in turn produce a corresponding
improvement in well-being among the recipient population. In other cases,
a plateau may be reached after which additional dollars do less good than
the dollars that went before—after every household has mosquito nets, say,
the next best uses of the money may be less effective at producing marginal improvements. Conversely, there may be a snowball effect, so that
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as more contributions are added, each does more and more good, at least
up to a point—think of class sessions added to an educational program, or
inoculations against communicable diseases within a community. Or the
curve may be S-shaped, with a range of increasing effectiveness followed by
a range of diminishing returns.14
Production functions for lumpy goods deliver outputs not in smooth,
regular increments as individual units of input are added, but rather in
large jumps after a series of inputs.15 At the extreme is a pure step good
that delivers all of its utility in one large chunk or “step.” Think again of a
bridge. Suppose you need to span a chasm that is a thousand yards long,
and the bridge material arrives in one-hundred-yard segments.
As shown in ﬁgure 1.1, value to users remains ﬂat as the ﬁrst nine segments are added, one by one. But when the tenth unit is added to create
a completed bridge, suddenly value steps up all at once. There is a sharp
discontinuity, illustrated by the dashed line in ﬁgure 1.1. The step not only
marks out a threshold under which no beneﬁts are provided, but also represents a plateau from which no further incremental improvements are
possible. Adding more lengths to the bridge once the span is complete
does no good.
In fact, such pure step goods are rare. Even a bridge can be supplied at
many different quality levels, as Russell Hardin has noted.16 An election
is also a common example of a step good—here, the inputs are the votes
that either do or do not reach the critical point that enables one’s preferred
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Figure 1.1. The Bridge. Source: Fennell, “Lumpy Property,” 1958, ﬁg. 1.
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candidate to win.17 Votes short of the amount necessary to win are useless in generating the desired outcome, while extra votes beyond that level
are superﬂuous. Of course, if one deﬁnes political objectives slightly more
broadly than choosing a winner in a particular contest, the step function
looks less sharp. Often we think that landslides produce at least somewhat
better results for the winner than do narrow victories, while near-misses
provide greater political impetus for another try than would a crushing
defeat. Nonetheless, these examples provide an intuitive sense of what a
lumpy or step good looks like.
Equally rare are perfectly linear goods—those with a smooth, continuous production function in which each inﬁnitesimally ﬁne unit of input
is matched by a corresponding adjustment in output or utility. Few products can be produced, purchased, or enjoyed in literally any quantity. Often
some minimum threshold must be crossed to obtain (or enjoy) the thing
at all, and many goods must be transacted over in integer units (bananas,
for instance). Even readily divisible goods—Wicksteed uses the example of
pudding servings for children—may be relatively valueless below a certain
quantity threshold.18
Between the extremes of a perfectly linear good and a single-step good,
we ﬁnd different degrees of nonlinearity or indivisibility.19 Consider ﬁgure 1.2, which depicts an S-curve. This curve corresponds to a relatively
lumpy good that does not take a pure step form.
Although this good does not deliver all its value in a single shot, its pro-
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Figure 1.2. The S-Curve. Source: Fennell, “Lumpy Property,” 1960, ﬁg. 2.
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duction function contains ranges over which the marginal effect of added
pieces is sharply increasing or decreasing. The S-curve describes many collective goods that require a critical mass of participation to succeed, but
that at some point plateau.20 It might also ﬁt with certain kinds of land
assembly projects, where value increases sharply once a certain number of
parcels are aggregated, but where having all the parcels is not essential.21
Lumpiness, as used in this book, refers to severe discontinuities or nonlinearities in the production function, whether or not those functions take
a pure step form or intersperse segments of sharply increasing or decreasing returns with ranges exhibiting linearity.22 These differences in shape are
important, however, because they can inﬂuence the prospects for cooperation and the risks of strategic behavior, as we will see in chapters 2 and 3.23
What’s in the Lump?
So far, I have spoken of “segments” or “pieces” that produce value when
aggregated together. Lumpiness or indivisibility often refers to quantities of
relatively fungible inputs—segments of a bridge, lengths of railroad track,
tires for a car, units of work, and so on. Yet it may also refer to systems
made up of heterogeneous elements, such as a machine that cannot operate without each and every one of its parts.24 I will use the notion of lumpiness broadly and functionally here to refer to both heterogeneous and homogeneous aggregations, given that both forms of lumpiness can generate
similarly structured problems.
In the context of land assembly, for example, the unique spatial location
of each parcel makes the component parts of the desired assembly unique
and nonfungible. But this sort of nonfungibility is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient to produce an assembly problem. Even if a group is building a
bridge out of identical, interchangeable segments, there may still be an assembly problem if there are no outside sources of bridge material and each
individual in the group holds a segment essential to the whole. Conversely,
a car may require many different mechanical parts to run (none of which
could substitute for each other), but there will be no difﬁculty assembling
the necessary pieces as long as each part is readily available on the open
market. The car is still lumpy in that its parts are interdependent and all
of them are needed, but this lumpiness may pass unnoticed as long as the
underlying markets for its inputs remain competitive. What matters most
to the shape of an assembly problem, then, is not whether the necessary
components are interchangeable with each other, but rather whether close
substitutes exist for each of the components required for a given assembly.
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As this example suggests, the lumpiness of a good or service is distinct
from the market conditions that inﬂuence whether, or how easily, the full
lump will be obtained. Familiar examples of lumpiness, like large-scale developments that require assembling many pieces of contiguous land, often
confront the holdout power held by the various owners of the component
parts. But the lumpiness of the project would remain (though it would
likely go unremarked) even if the property were all initially held by the developer. Thus, lumpiness tends to announce itself as such when some impediment stands in the way of achieving it or breaking it down—whether
monopoly power, technological limits, or other factors.
The components making up a given lump may also be segments of time.
Some goods, such as private residences, can become disproportionately
valuable when consumed over lengthy, unbroken periods. Often, the most
valuable temporal chunks are deﬁned by reference to external events, such
as the length of a life, a job, or an educational program, or the time that
it takes for a particular risky investment to yield returns—all of which can
be uncertain. Property rights that let owners hold onto things long enough
to realize distant or uncertain payoffs respond to this temporal lumpiness.
Finally, sometimes lumps represent not the way in which goods generate value, but rather technological or natural constraints on how goods are
produced or supplied. As we have seen, it is possible to have goods that
are lumpy in supply that become more valuable when divided (temporally
or physically) among different people. This kind of lumpiness indicates a
discontinuity or nonlinearity in the production process, perhaps due to
high ﬁxed costs or other economies of scale. Once the good is supplied, the
challenge is to come up with a plan for dividing the consumption experience. Indeed, without a plan for dividing the consumption experience, the
good may not be proﬁtable to supply in the ﬁrst place.

Subdividing Lumpiness
To get a better sense of the scope and variety of lumpiness-related issues
that crop up in the real world, and to more clearly see what is at stake, it is
helpful to consider some other ways of subdividing the category.
Goods and Bads
S
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So far I have spoken of lumpy goods. But sometimes an undesired end state
takes a lumpy shape. Russell Hardin gives the example of a power blackout to illustrate a step bad: the blackout will occur all at once if aggregate
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electricity usage exceeds a critical threshold.25 Or consider a population
crash that will cause the demise of a ﬁshery.26 Below some threshold of harvesting, nothing much changes, but once the threshold is crossed, disaster
ensues—a lumpy bad. When the goal is to avoid a catastrophic end state
(rather than to achieve a desired end state), the challenge becomes one of
limiting the piecemeal acts of harvesting or destruction that can combine
to push beyond the threshold of sustainability. This challenge can be recast
as one of assembling forbearance from those who are otherwise entitled to
draw from the common supply. Assembling enough forbearance to keep
the lights on or pull the ﬁshery back from the brink can be reconceptualized as achieving the lumpy good of “avoiding a blackout” or “avoiding a
population crash.”
In other cases, what is a lumpy good for some people is a lumpy bad for
others. Göran Bostedt analyzes the case of the Swedish wolf, whose preservation constitutes a public good for many Swedish nature lovers, but a
public bad for reindeer herders whose herds suffer depredation from the
wolf.27 Although it is possible to have more or fewer wolves, if the population threshold that is robust enough to satisfy the wildlife lovers also creates a serious threat to the herders, this is a lumpy state that will be sought
by some and opposed by others.28
Differences of opinion may also emerge as to whether a given resource
is more valuable when split up or when maintained as a unit. For example, what appears to be a problem of lumpiness in supply (a pet or job
that cannot be divided in half) may in fact be the most efﬁcient arrangement. Maybe nobody wants to sign up for half of your dog or the last three
hours of your job each week, at least not at a price you would ﬁnd agreeable. Splitting the resource might, in fact, destroy rather than create value.
In these cases, the key question is whether there is any gain to be had by
reconﬁguring—and the answer may turn on private information about valuations, as the next chapter discusses.
Natural versus Constructed
There is little mystery why bridge crossers demand a full rather than partial bridge—they are susceptible to gravity, and this fact about the physical world is reﬂected in the lumpiness of bridge structures. Likewise, a
lumpy bad like the extinction of a species turns on an ecological reality,
the threshold at which overhunting or habitat loss will render the population unsustainable. In these examples, lumpiness stems from naturally
occurring discontinuities. In other cases, lumpiness is a function of techno-
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logical constraints, such as a Coke machine that can take only nickels, or a
manufacturing process that requires a minimum production run to cover
high ﬁxed costs. In yet other cases, the lumpiness is constructed by law.
For example, a square footage minimum for apartments makes housing
lumpy for reasons that stem not from physical or technological limitations
on construction, but rather from (often contested) societal judgments.
Both private parties and policy makers may intentionally construct
lumps that are hard to break apart in order to force people to make choices
that are bundled, take-it-or-leave-it propositions. For example, the inability to negotiate over boilerplate terms in a lease or contract has the
effect of making the leasing or contracting decision lumpy. Even seemingly
mundane decisions about the size or quantities of products can inﬂuence
choices quite profoundly. Think of sugary sodas or cigarettes—goods often
viewed as bads when consumed to excess. The inability to choose one’s
preferred size or quantity of these items might result in reduced consumption for both psychological and economic reasons—or, alternatively, could
make matters even worse (if, say, one buys multiples of a smaller size that
amount to a larger total). Counterintuitively, even very large sizes might at
times be part of a strategy to reduce consumption, if it puts people to an
all-or-nothing choice in which “all” is unpalatably large.
An especially interesting form of constructed lumpiness involves property rights. To what degree do these rights correspond to cohesive “things”
(from which the owner can categorically exclude others) rather than bundles of entitlements that are either endlessly ﬂexible or at least socially and
culturally contingent? Henry Smith puts it this way: “Property organizes
this world into lumpy packages of legal relations—legal things—by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend to be strong complements.”29 Property ownership characteristically structures access to these
presumptively complementary resources through a block of delegated
control that excludes the uninvited and extends unbroken through time,
bundling access today with access tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.30 This setup allows people to reap what they have sown (both ﬁguratively and literally) and to hold onto the land or other asset as long as
necessary to see returns on their investments.
But property is not just lumpy; it is also sticky. Attributes that were at
one time complementary may tend to remain together as chunks of ownership (an entire car, say) long past the time when they continue to generate
more value aggregated than disaggregated. New business models that offer
thinly sliced rights in resources—from rides to tools to toys to lawns to
clothing—highlight the inherent lumpiness in traditional property owner-
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ship, as well as the possibility of alternatives.31 In other words, if the strong
complementarity that originally made us draw property lines here and not
there is contingent on social, cultural, and technological factors, rebundling
becomes necessary as conditions change. And we are currently seeing a
groundswell of changes along just these lines as new ways of slicing up access to goods and services become central to everyday life.
Property, then, provides an especially compelling setting in which to
consider foundational questions about natural and constructed lumps
of value. Do particular sets of rights (or particular physical or conceptual
objects) possess some inherent unity that resists splintering, or are lumps
instead largely of our own making? Gregory Alexander has recently explored similar questions in considering parallels between the “thing-ness”
of works of art and of property—both of which can prove much less stable than is often assumed.32 Those same concepts can assist in examining
other legally or socially constructed lumps to see whether they correspond
to valuable complementarities that should be maintained or whether they
are merely artifacts of past complementarities that exist no longer.
More broadly, the issue of composition—when (and whether) components may be said to form a coherent thing—is a subtle and philosophically interesting one. Peter van Inwagen presents a thought experiment in
which people believe they are seeing black tigers or “bligers” in the distance, when in fact they are seeing sets of six separate animals—four monkeys, a sloth, and an owl—moving in concert so that they appear to compose single creatures.33 As the bliger tale suggests, the fact that components
are in contact with one another does not necessarily make them part of the
same organism.34 Conversely, what might look like many separate entities
may instead be a single thing. Consider Pando, an aspen forest in Utah
made up of an estimated forty-seven thousand genetically identical trees
joined by a shared root structure, which is reputed to be the planet’s largest
living organism.35
Even when entities are intentionally constructed, questions remain
about what is inside and what is outside. Ronald Coase famously explored
the boundaries of a ﬁrm by considering the relative costs of conducting
transactions inside and outside the envelope of the business entity—the
make-or-buy decision.36 In urban contexts, the question of what counts
as part of the same city can have more than one answer depending on
whether one is referring to jurisdictional boundaries or functional interactions. Yet even the former is open to redeﬁnition, as can be seen in a plan
to split Sydney, Australia, into three separate cities.37
Law too must often make judgments about what counts as part of the
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same entity or event. What counts as a single crime, for example, and when
does it begin and end?38 Should a person’s past pattern of conduct be relevant in a tort action, just the moment that caused the accident, or something in between?39 Is a person’s whole life or some smaller slice the relevant unit when assessing inequality, pursuing societal well-being, or setting
tax policy?40 Similar aggregation questions run through all of law.
Rival versus Nonrival
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Another dimension for classifying indivisibilities involves the distinction
between rival and nonrival goods. Certain goods like ideas, songs, landscapes, and lighthouses do not get used up as people consume them—
this makes them “nonrival” in consumption. Nonrival goods are inherently lumpy in supply: supplying such goods for many people costs no
more than supplying them for one person.41 Nonrival goods are frequently
lumpy in a more familiar sense as well: they cannot be enjoyed at all until
a certain threshold is reached and gain nothing from inputs beyond that
level.42 As Fred Thompson explains, “half a lighthouse is, perhaps, worse
than useless, more than one is redundant.”43 These lumpy or “discrete”
nonrival goods are effectively one-offs; only a single unit of the underlying good is ever produced.44 They are all-or-nothing propositions, where
the question is not how much to produce, but whether to produce the thing
at all.45
Two opposing observations highlight the complex role of indivisibility in this analysis. First, lumpy nonrival goods can be easier to supply
through voluntary cooperation since anyone (or any set of anyones) who
cares enough about consuming the discrete good should be willing to underwrite its production, even though others will beneﬁt. The fact that others will beneﬁt may produce strategic behavior—everyone would prefer to
have others fund the good while enjoying it for free—but people may still
ﬁnd contributing to be in their rational self-interest.46
Second, and cutting in the other direction, nonrivalry disables the most
intuitive basis for divvying up access and payment among users: consumption. Because my eating a pint of berries precludes you eating the same pint
of berries, it seems only natural to charge me for the berries that I wish to
eat and to assign me exclusive rights in those berries. I am getting what I
paid for. Yet it is probable that the berries would be produced at exactly
the same scale even if I did not buy my marginal pint. It is unlikely my
purchase caused the berry patch and workers’ hours to be incrementally
expanded exactly one pint’s worth. Instead, investments in berry produc-
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tion are large scale and lumpy, but the units of berries are priced to cover
the production costs. Seen in this light, the nonrival good does not seem
much different—there is still a lump of production to fund—but because
the most intuitive basis for assessing payment obligations is absent, another funding approach is required. Chapter 3 will consider this question
further.

Types of Lumps
We can round out our survey of lumpiness with a nonexhaustive list of categories in which indivisibilities in supply or demand can be found, including goods, services, events, conditions, goals, and laws.
Goods
As we have seen, consumer goods may be offered in indivisible units, such
as an entire car or an all-the-time pet, when some consumers would prefer
smaller increments of ownership, such as a car for weekday mornings only
or a pet that is one’s own only on alternate weekends. Similarly, purchasing
a minivan or a three-bedroom home means owning the full structure all
of the time, even if a vehicle half as large would sufﬁce for the majority of
car trips and the third bedroom is only used a dozen days each year. Firms
and other large organizations like universities face related constraints: expansions in capacity may be available only in relatively large increments (a
new plant, a large chunk of network capacity, or a new building), producing a forced choice between inadequate capacity and capacity that will appear excessive, at least in the short run.47
Another aspect of lumpiness in supply, recently explored by Joel Waldfogel, relates to the ﬁxed costs of production, which can limit the variety
of goods produced.48 Here, the problem is not that individual customers
are forced to purchase more of a good than they desire, but rather that
consumers must collectively purchase a threshold amount of a given good
in order for its manufacture to be cost justiﬁed. Changes in the technologies of production and distribution have enabled a larger set of consumer
preferences to be served in many markets,49 but those with nonmainstream
tastes may still ﬁnd themselves out in the cold, especially for goods and
services that must be consumed locally and thus cannot draw on a larger
market. For example, commercial airline routes serving particular cities depend on a critical mass of passengers for their viability—a fact that has led
to federal subsidies for service to smaller communities.50
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We have seen that goods often must be consumed in particular quantities or combinations in order to deliver value—whether matched sets of
shoes or tires, or complementary goods like printers and ink cartridges—a
fact that presents few difﬁculties if the relevant markets are competitive. But
when monopoly power exists over some or all of the components, aggregation can become difﬁcult. Land assembly is a special case of this general
problem. Similar issues exist for products or creative works that depend on
inputs to which others hold intellectual property rights.
Services
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Like the manufacturer who has a minimum efﬁcient size for a production
run or product, entities or persons providing services may not be willing or
able to supply those services in minutely divided segments. For example,
because a plumber cannot make half a service call, the amount paid for
the call must cover the cost of time and vehicle use necessary to actually
complete the call. To be sure, the plumber can do greater or lesser amounts
of work while out on the call, can use more or less expensive materials, and
greater or lesser amounts of skill. But the client must at least cover the cost
of getting out to the site and spending some minimum amount of time
there or the service input will not be made at all.
The ﬂip side of lumpy service inputs is lumpy service requirements.
Here, think of the many young lawyers who complain that they would prefer to work somewhat shorter hours for lower pay, but ﬁnd this alternative
unavailable to them at major law ﬁrms. Here, the operative lumpiness may
have little to do with the indivisibility of their own inputs—many could, in
fact, easily work 10 or 20 percent fewer hours.51 Rather, the problem is that
their employer requires a certain minimum amount of service in order to
offer them jobs at all. If they fail to put in the requisite hours, the result is
not a proportionately downscaled salary, but rather withdrawal of the employment opportunity altogether. The indivisibility in service requirements
may be driven by the economics of hiring, training, and offering beneﬁt
packages to larger versus smaller numbers of workers. In some cases, however, such indivisibility may be artiﬁcially constructed by ﬁrms in an effort to screen out workers who are less willing to work hard or who have
signiﬁcant outside demands on their time that might tend to reduce their
productivity or availability.52
Often indivisibilities exist in both supply and demand for services, but
are at least roughly congruent with each other. Dentists presumably prefer to provide complete dental procedures rather than partial ones, and
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patients strongly concur—no one wants to buy just the “drilling out” portion of a cavity-ﬁlling procedure. In this context, lumpiness presents few
problems, although the full lump may be ﬁnancially unattainable for some
patients. It is interesting, however, that the lumpiness is much more acute
for the patient. A holdup problem might occur if dentists could perform
the drilling-out portion and then renegotiate the price for the ﬁlling’s completion. Luckily, professional norms, law, and repeat play protect consumers against this strategy, but we can see a similar problem in some other
contexts.
For example, a leading actor who performs for an entire season of a
television show or an entire run of a play may generate many times more
value than if he appears for only part of the series. Even if the performer
also gains a greater lump of value (in terms of fame or reputation) from
completing the entire series than quitting midway through, he may have
much less to lose from dropping out than the show’s producers do. What
is to stop such an actor from threatening to walk off the project partway
through unless the contract is renegotiated on more favorable terms? This
is exactly what James Gandolﬁni, star of The Sopranos, did at one point
(and it worked—he got more money).53
More broadly, indivisibilities present the potential for contracting parties to apply leverage to each other. Renovations, auto repairs, medical
procedures, and many similar services exhibit indivisibilities that make it
difﬁcult for consumers to readily switch to a competitor midway through.
Information asymmetries may also make it difﬁcult to know whether an
announced change in price as the work progresses represents a strategic
ploy to exploit the leverage provided by the lumpy situation or simply a response to new information that has been uncovered in the earlier phases of
the work. In some contexts, dual sourcing or similar approaches can alleviate switching costs and potentially police strategic efforts to extract more
surplus.54
Events and Conditions
Many important outcomes have a lumpy or binary quality—a population of animals crashes or remains sustainable, a candidate is elected or
defeated, an accident occurs or it does not. When investments made by different parties combine to produce outcomes, the problem has features that
resemble those involving contributions to a step good such as a bridge.
The key is to induce each party to contribute amounts that, when combined, will be just sufﬁcient, but not excessive, to produce the result. In
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the examples just given, the events and conditions feature the same lumpy
demand patterns as we have observed with goods and services.
Inputs to these desirable or undesirable conditions may themselves be
lumpy as well—a form of lumpiness in supply. Consider the goal of avoiding an accident. Some variables, like driving speed, are continuous, but
others are all-or-nothing: a car either has antilock brakes or it doesn’t. Getting to the no-accident condition requires combining enough contributions
to safety, but ﬁguring out how to get there when some contributions are
binary and others are incremental can be challenging. Similar issues arise
in keeping pollution below particular thresholds, where some inputs (like
adding a scrubber to a factory) are indivisible and others (like reducing
operating hours) are incremental. In addition to ﬁnding the “cheapest cost
avoider,”55 it may be important to identify who is the cheapest precaution
slicer—the party best able to scale precautionary inputs to avoid a lumpy
event like an accident.
Personal Goals
Often people set goals for themselves (or have goals set for them by others) that have a lumpy or all-or-nothing quality. People may create rules
that bundle together all instances of a given type of behavior (such as not
drinking or not eating meat), or they may come up with plans that help
them realize lumpy personal goods (like a ﬁtness target or writing a book)
or avoid lumpy bads (such as alcoholism or other forms of addiction).
The ability of people to achieve their goals may be heavily inﬂuenced by
the way their choice sets are conﬁgured, which depends in turn on how
markets and law interact. Lumpiness plays a large role in human cognition
more generally. Indeed, many common aphorisms testify to the ubiquity
of these considerations in everyday life, such as “in for a penny, in for a
pound,” “it’s only a drop in the bucket,” “well begun is half done,” “it’s
now or never,” or “it’s the least I could do.”
Law
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Law interacts with many forms of lumpiness that have already been introduced. Perhaps most obviously, law can make it easier or harder to slice up
uniﬁed things or assemble fragmented things. For example, eminent domain allows certain kinds of land aggregations to occur more easily, while
other legal rules address the slicing up of uniﬁed property interests. There
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are many laws and regulations that encourage or discourage, even when
they do not mandate or forbid, particular ways of dividing up everything
from risk to contractual obligations to families to jobs to units of housing.
The law may also specify minimum or maximum lumps of production or
consumption (such as minimum lot sizes or maximum soft drink sizes).
Moreover, law is often used to bring about or avoid circumstances, conditions, or occurrences that have a lumpy or step quality. The tax system,
for example, mandates contributions that ensure that enough money will
be aggregated to purchase lumpy public goods like bridges. Regulations
operate to keep a ﬁshery sustainable or to keep pollution below a critical threshold. Likewise, there may be a threshold level of enforcement of
criminal laws that must be met within a given jurisdiction before inhabitants enjoy a sense of “law and order,” and a minimum level of property
rights protection that is necessary to induce widespread investment and
reliance. Uniform accessibility requirements like curb cuts or wheelchair
ramps can enable mobility throughout an entire community, producing
an aggregate value analogous to that of a completed highway.56 And even
the mundane legal restriction of banning smoking in bars lets barhoppers
dodge the lumpy bad of smelly clothing that even one smoke-ﬁlled bar
would inﬂict.57
Finally, law itself may exhibit lumpiness. Many legal outcomes are allor-nothing—a defendant is guilty or not guilty, liable or not liable, required to hand over a disputed piece of property entirely or allowed to
keep it forever.58 In making these binary choices, law must also decide how
the process of choosing a winner will proceed, including how the inputs
to particular legal outcomes—such as pieces of evidence—will be aggregated together or considered separately. When a driver suffers a lapse of
attention, for example, should we look just at the fateful moment or at her
larger pattern of driving behavior in assessing liability?
There may also be lumpiness in the supply of legal rules, if there are
high ﬁxed costs or other considerations that make producing additional
laws or legal classiﬁcations costly.59 Consider numerus clausus—the notion
that only a ﬁxed, limited number of property forms are permissible and
that further customization is disfavored. In Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith’s account, the limited number of forms economizes on information
costs.60 People interacting with the property system may prefer that property interests be delivered in a small number of familiar forms, not only
to make transacting easier, but also so that they can understand their own
holdings and avoid encroaching on those of others.61 Likewise, regulations
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may be easier to produce and understand when they cluster around a few
standard property forms than if different laws must be created and heeded
for an inﬁnite variety of alternatives.62

Why Should We Care?
This survey of lumpiness might seem to prove too much. If so many everyday phenomena can be recast as lumpy or indivisible, we might wonder
how signiﬁcant the concept can really be. Why should it merit our attention? This book will answer that question in some detail. To preview, there
are three main reasons we should care about lumpiness—and, by extension, about problems of segmentation and division.
First and most obviously, the concept of lumpiness bears on a wide
range of efforts to optimally conﬁgure resources, from land assembly to car
sharing. I show how problems of dividing and aggregating are not distinct
problems, but rather share a common structure, one that is informed by attention to lumpy production functions.
Second, an understanding of lumpiness allows us to recast many collective action problems, legal puzzles, and social conﬂicts in terms of indivisibilities and complementarities, which makes it easier to resolve them.
Many of the most difﬁcult problems known to law and policy involve
choosing between two (or more) sets of complementary goods, and lumpiness offers a framework for doing so.
Third, lumpiness can be intentionally leveraged to advance personal or
social goals by altering or constructing the choice sets that actors confront.
Interactions with others and even with oneself look different if moves can
only be made in certain-sized chunks than if they can be selected in ﬁne
degrees from a continuous menu.
Through these channels, lumpiness inﬂuences private and informal
governance regimes, formal law, and even the efforts of individuals to manage different temporal versions of themselves. Its signiﬁcance extends from
the most personal realms (an individual’s efforts to complete a project or
stick to a diet) to the largest and most public concerns (such as eminent
domain, housing policy, or environmental protection). The balance of the
book will show how lumpiness cashes out in a range of contexts.
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